We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism.
Introduction
Centralized clearing houses based on the deferred-acceptance mechanism are at the heart of many successful real-world matching markets (Roth, 1984a; Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003; Sönmez and Switzer, 2013; Sönmez, 2013) . Deferred-acceptance mechanisms are appealing, because they produce stable outcomes, meaning that no subgroup of agents can find a mutually beneficial deviation and thus would have a reason to contract outside the market.
1 Moreover, it is safe for the applying side of the market to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Thus, the mechanism successfully aggregates the information in the market and levels the playing field for naive and sophisticated participants.
In some applications, the market does not only match agents, but determines also the contractual details of the match. In a labor market, firms and workers may have some discretion on how to set the salary. In the cadet-to-branch match (Sönmez and Switzer, 2013) , cadets can choose between different lengths of service time in exchange for a higher priority in their branch of choice. In a college admission problem, students can be admitted with or without a stipend. These markets can be understood as hybrids between matching markets and auctions and have first been analyzed in the seminal paper of Kelso and Crawford (1982) , with later important extensions by Roth (1984b) ; Fleiner (2003) ; Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) ; Hatfield and Kojima (2009) among others. In a general model of many-toone matching with endogenous contracting, a generalized version of the deferred acceptance mechanism can be defined, and is stable and group-strategy-proof under the assumption that contracts are substitutes for colleges 2 and the law of aggregate demand holds.
3
In many applications of matching models with contracts, there is a natural ordering on contract terms and it is reasonable to assume that preferences are monotone with respect to the ordering: In the cadet-to-branch matching model of Sönmez and Switzer (2013) the contract-term is the service time in the military and it is natural to assume that cadets prefer a shorter to a longer service in the same branch. This assumption is for example made in the analysis of Jagadeesan (2016) . In college admission problems (Hassidim et al., 2017; Abizada and Dur, 2017) with stipends, it is natural to assume that students prefer being admitted with a stipend to being admitted without a stipend at the same college, or more generally, being admitted with a higher stipend than a lower stipend at the same college.
4 For the medical match, mechanisms which allow for flexible salaries have been proposed (Crawford, 2008) , and it seems reasonable that doctors in these mechanisms would prefer working for a higher salary rather than a lower salary at the same hospital. In this paper we provide a full analysis of matching markets with contracts where students have monotone preferences.
5 Monotonicity means that contract terms are totally ordered and students' preferences are monotone with respect to this ordering. Under the assumption of monotone preferences, we show that substitutability and the law of aggregate demand are not only sufficient, but also essentially necessary for the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanism. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of an equivalent choice profile. A DA-equivalent choice profile is a choice profile such that the (student-proposing) deferred-acceptance algorithm produces the same outcome if the original choice profile is replaced by the equivalent choice profile. The domain of choice profiles that are (1) DA-equivalent to a choice profile under which contract are substitutes for colleges and the law of aggregate demand holds, and for which (2) the deferred-acceptance algorithm is stable, turns out to be equivalent to the domain of choice profiles under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds -two notions recently introduced by Hatfield et al. (2018) . Moreover, these choice profiles form a maximal (Cartesian and unitary) domain for the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanism.
Our result have two important consequences: First, for monotone preferences, group-strategy-proofness is "for free" in the sense that the maximal domain for the existence of a strategy-proof and stable mechanism is also maximal for the existence of a group-strategy-proof and stable mechanism. Second obtain an embedding result in the sense of Jagadeesan (2016) for the class of choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds. Thus, if attention is restricted to the case of monotone preferences for students, it is, in some sense without loss of generality to work with the model of matching with salaries of Kelso and Crawford (1982) rather than the full matching with contracts model.
Related Literature
Stable many-to-one matching mechanisms and their incentive properties have been extensively studied (Hatfield and Kojima, 2010; Chen et al., 2016; Hirata and Kasuya, 2017; Kominers and Sönmez, 2016; Hatfield et al., 2018) . Most papers focus on the pure matching model or on the matching with contracts model (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005; Roth, 1984b; Fleiner, 2003) . Working with monotone preferences makes our strategy of revealing preferences truthfully, rather than that they have non-monotone preferences.
5 Colleges' preferences are not necessarily monotone in our analysis.
model less general than the full matching with contracts model. In particular, all sufficient conditions for stability and the existence of a stable and (group)-strategyproof mechanism from the literature on matching with contracts also apply to our model. However, conditions that are necessary for the general model with contracts are not necessary conditions for the model with monotone preferences. Thus our results are independent from previous results for the matching with contracts model. For (group)-strategy-proofness, this is because certain preference manipulations are ruled out by our model. A student must report monotone preferences. Thus, a student cannot rank being admitted to a college without a stipend above being admitted to the same college with a stipend. Similarly, weaker conditions are sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable allocations than those for markets with non-monotone preferences.
6
In recent work, Abizada and Dur (2017) make similar observations and consider a model of college admissions with stipends where complementarities in contract terms are present for colleges: In their model three contract terms {t + , t 0 , t − } are available, interpreted as admission with stipend, admission without stipend but with tuition waiver, and admission without either of the two, and the number of 6 To illustrate this point, consider a college admission problem of the following kind: There are two colleges c 1 , c 2 and three students s 1 , s 2 , s 3 . Suppose there are two kinds of contracts: A student can be admitted with stipend (represented by the contract term "1") or without stipend (represented by the contract term "0"). The colleges have choice functions induced (in the usual way) by the following preferences
Suppose student always prefer to be admitted at a college under a stipend to being admitted at the same college without a stipend. Going through all different cases, one can show that, for any preferences satisfying this monotonicity assumption, a stable allocation (in the matching with contracts sense) exists. This changes if students can report non-monotonic preferences. Consider the following preferences:
Student s 2 prefers to go to college c 1 without a stipend rather than a stipend. Thus, in a stable allocation it will never be the case that s 2 goes to college c 1 with a stipend, because otherwise c 1 and s 2 could block that allocation. This in turn implies that no stable allocation exists: The allocation that matches all three students to c 1 without stipend is blocked by student s 3 and college c 2 . Any allocation that matches s 1 to c 2 without stipend is blocked by students s 1 , s 2 and s 3 being admitted to college c 1 without stipend. Any allocation that matches s 3 to c 2 without stipend is blocked by student s 1 being admitted to college c 2 without a stipend. Finally, all other allocations are either not individually rational or blocked by students s 1 , s 2 and s 3 being admitted to college c 1 without a stipend.
t − -contracts signed by a college constraints the number of t + -contracts it signs. Importantly, students have monotone preferences in these contract terms. The model is a special case of ours. In particular, the result for "Max-Min Responsive" preferences can be obtained as a special case of ours and for this case their strategy-proofness result can be strengthened to group-strategy-proofness. However, Abizada and Dur (2017) also analyze pairwise-stable outcomes and this part of their analysis does not have a counter-part in our paper. Our original working paper (Schlegel, 2016 ) contained a version of our maximal domain result for a model of matching with contracts where also colleges' choice functions are monotone in contract-terms. Technically the two maximal domain results are independent. However, the adaption to obtain the previous version of the theorem from the current one are minimal.
7 The current version of the maximality result can also be obtained with a similar proof as the one in the previous version.
8 For the original version of the theorem we refer the interested reader to the original version of the working paper.
While preparing the current version of the paper, Hatfield et al. (2018) released a new version of their working paper, where the authors also analyze preferences restrictions such as monotonicity and show that their analysis of observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand extend to restricted preferences domains such as monotone preferences. Their additional work allows us to shorten the proof of the "sufficiency part" of our maximal domain result considerably. It now suffices to show that observable substitutability and the observable law of aggregate demand for monotone preferences (which for choice functions that are monotone in contract terms, are equivalent to the virtual substitutability and virtual law of aggregate demand conditions from our original working paper) imply DA-equivalence to a profile of choice functions under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds. We emphasize however that our result for monotone preferences is stronger than the new result in Hatfield et al. (2018) in the following regards: We obtain the stronger incentive property of group-strategy-proofness instead of just strategy-proofness.
9 Moreover, the "nonmanipulability" axiom is redundant under monotone preferences.
10 Finally, the explicit construction of an equivalent choice profile allows for a natural interpre-7 One has to make sure that in the "necessity part" of the maximal domain proof, the profile of unitary choice functions for the other colleges can be chosen to be induced by monotone preferences.
8 The main difference is that now stability of the deferred acceptance algorithm for the original choice profile has to be assumed on top of DA-equivalence.
9 The mechanisms fall outside of the domain defined by Barberà et al. (2016) on which strategy-proofness is equivalent to group-strategy-proofness. Thus, it is not sufficient to only show strategy-proofness and invoke the result of Barberà et al. (2016) .
10 The "non-manipulability" axiom is discussed in more detail in Remark 1.
tation of the conditions of observable substitutability and the observable law of aggregate demand. In particular, our result can be interpreted as an embedding result for the matching with contracts model into a Kelso-Crawford economy in the sense of Jagadeesan (2016).
Model and Known Results

Model
There are two finite disjoint sets of agents, a set of colleges C and a set of students S. There is a finite set of possible contract-terms T which are totally ordered by ⊲. Colleges can accept students under different bilateral contracts. The set of possible contracts is X ⊆ C × S × T . For a contract x ∈ X, we denote by x C ∈ C the college involved in x, by x S ∈ S the student involved in X, and by x T ∈ T the contract term involved in x. We write
Xc → 2 Xc that from each set Y ⊆ X c chooses a subset of contracts. Each college can only sign one contract with any given student, i.e. for each x, y ∈ Ch c (Y ) with x = y we have x S = y S . Throughout this paper, we assume that all considered choice functions satisfy the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) (Aygün and Sönmez, 2013) , which means that for all
We also define a rejection function R c : 2
We denote the set of all choice functions for college c ∈ C that satisfy IRC, by C c .
Each student s has preferences s over different contracts involving him, and an outside option which we denote by "∅". We make the following assumption on students' preferences:
2. Preferences are monotone in contract terms, for each x, x ′ ∈ X with x S = x ′ S we have
We denote the set of all strict and monotone preferences for student s ∈ S by R s . A market is a pair (Ch, ) consisting of a choice profile Ch = (Ch c ) c∈C ∈ × c∈C C c and a preference profile = ( s ) s∈S ∈ × s∈S R s .
An allocation is a set Y ⊆ X that contains at most one contract per student. We denote the set of allocations by A. In the following it will be useful to define for each set of contracts Y ⊆ X c with a college c the allocation
of contracts that gives each student the worst contract among the contract in Y , 
Mechanisms
A mechanism (for the students) is a mapping from preference profiles to allo-
Mechanism M is strategy-proof if it is a weakly dominant strategy for students to report their true preferences to the mechanism,
Let Ch be a choice profile. Mechanism M is Ch-stable if for each ∈ × s∈S R s allocation M( ) is stable in (Ch, ).
Examples
Several examples from applied marked design fit into our model. Later in Section 3.4, we will show how our results apply to these models.
Job matching
A finite Kelso-Crawford economy consists of a finite set of firms F , a finite set of workers W , a finite set of salaries Σ ⊆ R ++ and a profile u i∈F ∪W of utility functions, where for each f ∈ F , utility function u f assigns to each
is strictly decreasing in salaries, and for each w ∈ W , the utility function u w assigns to each (f, p) ∈ F × Σ a utility level u w (f, p) and a utility level to the outside option u w (∅) such that for each w ∈ W , u w (f, ·) is strictly increasing in salaries.
The model fits in our framework with
and preferences ( w ) w∈W are induced by utility functions (u w ) w∈W . Note that the constructed market with contracts (Ch, ) does not only satisfy monotonicity of students' preferences, but also monotonicity of colleges' choice function, where for c ∈ C, Ch c is monotone in contract-terms if for each
College admission with stipend
A college admission problem with stipends of Hassidim et al. (2017) , consists of set of colleges C, a set of students S, a finite set of contract terms T ⊆ N, where each t ∈ T correspond to a funding level, a set of contracts X ⊆ C × S × T and preferences ( i ) i∈C∪S for colleges and students. Preferences of a student s are over X s ∪ {∅} and monotone with respect to >. Preferences of colleges are responsive according to quotas ((q
Cadet to branch matching
A cadet-to-branch matching problem of Sönmez (2013) , consist of a set of cadets I, a set of branches B, a finite set of service times t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t k , a profile of order of merit lists (≫ b ) b∈B which are strict priority orderings over I, and a profile of capacities (q
B . Choice functions of branches are "bid for your career (BfYC) choice functions" which can be informally described as follows (for a formal description see the original paper of Sönmez, 2013) next ranked cadets according to ≫ b and selects for each of them the contract with the longest service time available. The model fits in our framework with C = B,
Stable Allocations
In general, a stable allocation does not need to exist for our model. A sufficient condition for stability is that contracts are substitutes for colleges, i.e. if a contract is chosen from some set of contracts, then this contract is also chosen from each subset of that set of contracts.
Substitutability (Roth, 1984b; Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005) :
Not only is substitutability sufficient for the existence of a stable allocation but it also guarantees that the set of stable allocations has a lattice structure. If contracts are substitutes for colleges, then the set of stable allocation forms a lattice with respect to the preferences of students (Blair, 1988) . In particular, there is a unique stable allocation that is most preferred by all students among all stable allocations. We call this allocation the student-optimal stable allocation. It can be found by the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm that is defined as follows.
1. Each student applies under his favorite acceptable and unrejected contract or stays alone, if he finds no unrejected contract acceptable.
2. Each college tentatively accepts the contracts it chooses among the proposed contracts and rejects all other contracts.
3. If no applications has been rejected in the current round, the chosen contracts form the final allocation. If some applications are rejected we repeat.
We denote the outcome of the DA-algorithm in market (Ch, ) by DA(Ch, ).
The deferred acceptance mechanism for Ch assigns to each ∈ × s∈S R s the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm DA(Ch, ). In general, the deferred acceptance algorithm does not need to converge to a stable allocation. It could be the case that a student s applies in some round to some college c which tentatively accepts the student, but another college c ′ wants to recall an application made by s to c ′ in an earlier round that c ′ had previously rejected. Substitutability rules out this possibility, since it guarantees that colleges will never want to recall applications made in previous rounds. Later we will see that also weaker conditions than substitutability guarantee the convergence to a stable allocation.In the following, we call a choice profile Ch DA-stable if for each ∈ × s∈S R s , allocation DA(Ch, ) is stable.
Student-optimality is related to group-strategy-proofness. Under substitutability and the following additional condition on the colleges' choice functions the deferred acceptance mechanism is group-strategy-proof. (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005) 
Law of Aggregate Demand
The following proposition summarizes known results about side-optimal stable allocations, the invariance of the set of matched students in stable allocations (the rural hospitals theorem), and group-strategy-proofness.
Proposition 1 (Kelso and Crawford, 1982; Blair, 1988; Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005; Hatfield and Kojima, 2009 
Results
Equivalent Choice Functions
It is a natural question whether the conditions of Section 2.4 for the stability and group-strategy-proofness of the deferred acceptance mechanism are also necessary.
Next we provide a counter example showing that substitutability and the law of aggregate demand are not necessary for the deferred-acceptance mechanism to be stable and group-strategy-proof. The choice function example will have the following structure: There is one college c for which contracts are not substitutes. For each college except for c, contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds. However, c's choice function can be replaced by another choice function, such that 1. the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is the same under the original choice profile and the profile where c's choice function is replaced, 2. under the replacing choice function, contracts are substitutes for c and the law of aggregate demand holds.
The deferred acceptance mechanism is stable and group-strategy-proof both for the original market and the market where we have replaced c's choice function by the other choice function.
Example 1. We reconsider the college c 1 from the example in Footnote 8. Let
The choice function of the college is
else. 
Now consider the alternative choice function Ch
Note that under Ch c 1 contracts are not substitutes as x ∈ Ch c 1 (X) = {x, y, z} but x / ∈ Ch c 1 (X \ {z}) = {y} and that under Ch . Let ∈ × s∈S R s . We show that the deferred acceptance algorithm process in the market (Ch, ) and the deferred acceptance algorithm in the market (Ch ′ , ) converge to the same allocation. Observe that the choice functions Ch c 1 and Ch ′ c 1 differ only for sets Y ⊆ X with {x, y, z} ⊆ Y . In particular, for the deferred acceptance algorithm to differ in the two markets, student s 2 must apply to c 1 under contract y during the deferred acceptance algorithm in (Ch, ). Note however that before s 2 applies to c 1 under contract y, he applies to c 1 under contract y ′ , as y ′ T ⊲ y T . But once the process tentatively matches s 2 to c 1 under contract y ′ , the college will not subsequently drop the contract or accept additional contracts. Thus, s 2 will never apply to c 1 under contract y. Hence, the deferred acceptance algorithm in the two markets converge to the same allocation, which is the student-optimal stable allocation in (Ch ′ , ). By Proposition 1, the deferred acceptance mechanism for Ch ′ is group-strategyproof and Ch ′ -stable. It is also easy to see that, as Ch c 1 is induced by monotone preferences, the mechanism is Ch-stable as well. Thus, there is a Ch-stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism.
The example motivates the following definition. From this definition and Proposition 1, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2. If Ch is DA-equivalent to a profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds, then the deferred acceptance mechanism for Ch is group-strategy-proof.
If contracts are substitutes under the equivalent choice profile, the deferred acceptance mechanism is stable for the equivalent choice profile. It is not in general true that the deferred acceptance mechanism is also stable for the original choice profile. The outcome can fail to be stable, if colleges would like to recall contracts that they had rejected during a previous round of the deferred acceptance algorithm. In Hatfield et al. (2018) propose a condition on choice functions, called observable substitutability, that rules out exactly the problem that during the deferred acceptance algorithm colleges would like to recall contracts. We next introduce this property formally and derive some useful implications.
In the following, a sequence of contracts x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x τ is generated from monotone preferences if for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ and each x ∈ X with x S = x t S and
12 A similar notion has been introduced independently by Jagadeesan (2016). However, since Jagadeesan (2016) does not assume monotonicity on student preferences, his notion of DAequivalence is much stronger. Without monotonicity, DA-equivalence requires that choices coincide on all sets of contracts which contain at most one contract per student. (see Theorem 1 of Jagadeesan, 2016) . With monotonicity the choices only have to coincide at some of these sets of contracts.
substitutability for monotone preferences is defined as follows:
Observable Substitutability (Hatfield et al., 2018) : A choice function Ch c is observably substitutable for monotone preferences if for each observable sequence x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x τ under Ch c that is generated from monotone preferences, we have
Similarly, we can define an observable version of the law of aggregate demand. }| for each 0 < t < τ.
Since we exclusively deal with monotone preferences, from now one we drop the term "for monotone preferences." However, we emphasize that observable substitutability for monotone preferences is a weaker notion than observable substitutability for general preferences. In the following, we call a set of contracts Y ⊆ X c observable under Ch c , if there is a sequence of contracts x 1 , . . . , x |Y | that is observable under Ch c and generated from monotone preferences such that
It is straightforward to see that substitutability (the law of aggregate demand) for observable sequences (generated by monotone preferences) implies substitutability (the law of aggregate demand) for observable sets. We prove a stronger version of this result, which will be useful in the subsequent proofs. 
If moreover, the observable law of aggregate demand holds for Ch c , then
Proof. First we prove the existence of a unique maximal observable subset. The proof strategy is due to Hirata and Kasuya (2014) . We use induction on the size of the set Y . Now consider Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X c and letZ ⊆ Z andỸ ⊆ Y be the unique maximal observable subsets under Ch c . Let z 1 , . . . , z |Z| be an observable sequence, generated from monotone preferences such thatZ = {z 1 , . . . , z |Z| }. Maximally extend the sequence to a sequence z 1 , . . . , z |Z| , z |Z|+1 , . . . , zỸ with z |Z|+1 , . . . , zỸ ∈Ỹ that is observable and generated from monotone preferences. SinceỸ is observable, we haveỸ = {z 1 , . . . , z |Z| , z |Z|+1 , . . . , zỸ }. Thus observable substitutability applied to the sequence {z 1 , . . . , z |Z| , z |Z|+1 , . . . , zỸ } implies
and the observable law of aggregate demand applied to {z 1 , . . . , z
Another consequence of observable substitutability is that the deferred acceptance mechanisms is stable and the proposed contracts during the algorithm form an observable set. The following lemma is due to Hatfield et al. (2018) .
13
Lemma 4. Let (Ch, ) be a market such that contracts are observable substitutes. With the two lemmata, we obtain the following result. will follow from substitutability and the law of aggregate (see Aygün and Sönmez, 2013) or Ch ′ c which we will establish next.
First note that Ch
Immediately from this, we obtain the law of aggregate demand for Ch ′ c , as
To show that contracts are substitutes under Ch 
A Maximal Domain Result
An immediate consequence of our Theorem 5 is that DA-stability and DA-equivalence to profile such that contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of group-strategy-proof and stable mechanism, in the following sense: In the following a choice domain is a set
where D c ⊆ C c for each college c ∈ C. A choice function Ch c for college c is unit there exists a Ch-stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism.
Remark 1. Hatfield et al. (2018) prove that the domain of all choice profiles under which contracts are observable substitutes, the observable law of aggregate demand holds and which satisfy a property called non-manipulability, is a maximal unitary Cartesian domain for the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism. Nonmanipulability requires that for each profile in the domain the deferred-acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof on the domain of preference profiles where only contracts with a given college c are acceptable. Whereas this property is in general independent of the other two properties, our Corollary 6 implies that this property is implied by observable substitutability and the observable law of aggregate demand for monotone preferences.
An embedding result
As a second consequence of Theorem 5, we obtain an embedding result. In recent work Jagadeesan (2016) shows that for BfYC choice profiles as introduced in Section 2.3.3 there is a DA-equivalent choice profile such that the DA-equivalent market can be embedded into a Kelso-Crawford economy. There are three differences between the result by Jagadeesan (2016) and earlier result by Echenique (2012) that has been extended by Kominers (2012) ; Schlegel (2015): 1. The results apply to different domains of choice functions.
2. The result of Jagadeesan (2016) requires to first construct a DA-equivalent choice profile. The embedding is then performed for a market where the original choice profile is replaced by the equivalent choice profile. So his embedding establishes an isomorphism between the deferred acceptance algorithm in the original market and the salary adjustment process in the Kelso-Crawford economy. In contrast to this, Echenique (2012) establishes a full isomophism between the sets of stable allocations in the original market and the Kelso-Crawford market.
3. Utility function in the Kelso-Crawford economy satisfy stronger regularity conditions in Jagadeesan (2016) . In Echenique (2012) , monotonicity of utility functions can only be achieved for salaries corresponding to "un-dominated" contracts (see the discussion in Schlegel, 2015) , whereas in Jagadeesan (2016) monotonicity can be achieved for all salaries. Moreover, the utility functions for firms can be chosen to be quasi-linear in salaries.
Thus, the notion of isomorphism of Jagadeesan (2016) is neither weaker (because of 3.) nor stronger (because of 2.) than the one of Echenique (2012) . In the following, when we talk of a "embedding result" we mean embedding in the sense of Jagadeesan (2016) . Formally, an isomorphism in the sense of Jagadeesan, 2016(see Definition C.2 in his paper) between a matching market with contracts (Ch, ) and a Kelso-Crawford-economy (Σ, u) is a bijection (f, w, σ) :
2. for each x, x ′ ∈ X we have
3. for each c ∈ C and Y ⊆ X c we have
14 With this definition we obtain the following result. ′ we do not assume quasi-linearity of firm utility functions in the Kelso-Crawford economy. In this sense our result is weaker. However, our result applies to a larger domain of choice functions.
Applications 3.4.1 Job matching with salaries
In a Kelso-Crawford economy where firms' utility functions are quasi-linear in salaries, our Theorem 5, can be simplified considerably. Quasi-linearity implies the following invariance property of the choice function: A choice function satisfies demand-invariance if for Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X c such that Z s = Y s for s / ∈ Ch c (Z) S , we have Ch c (Y ) S = Ch c (Z) S . A direct consequence of this property is that the equivalent choice profile in Theorem 5, can be chosen to be the original profile. More generally this proposition holds for monotone choice functions satisfying demand invariance. We obtain the following corollary: Proof. By Proposition 8 and Theorem 5, for each substitutable valuation profile there exists a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism. For the opposite direction note that the proof of Theorem 1 in Hatfield et al. (2018) can be slightly modified such that the constructed unit demand choice functions are induced by quasi-linear valuations.
Remark 3. In a continuous Kelso-Crawford model with quasi-linear utility for firms, substitutable valuations do not only form a maximal domain of valuations for the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism, but also for the existence for a stable allocation. (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999) See the example in Appendix A of Schlegel (2018) .
College admission with stipends
For a choice function from the class defined by Hassidim et al. (2017) , the virtual choice function can be defined as follows: The choice Ch c (Y ) of college c from Y ⊆ X c is constructed iteratively. Consider the student s who is ranked top according to ≫ c in Y S and choose the contract with the smallest stipend with i in Y that does not make the choice violate the quota. Remove, all contracts with i from Y and iterate. Observe that, in the language of Hassidim et al. (2017) , the virtual choice function prioritizes merit over need in college admission. This highlights the fundamental trade-off in Hassidim et al. (2017) : if stability and (group)-strategy-proofness are required the mechanism behaves necessarily, by our equivalence result, like a mechanisms that assigns seats based on merit only (as encoded in the master list) and keeps stipends as low as possible independently of the applicant.
